

## The Measurement and Structure of Human Rights Attitudes

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**ABSTRACT.** To investigate the structure of attitudes toward human rights, the authors developed the Human Rights Questionnaire (HRQ) and administered it to two North American samples; the first sample included 365 college students, and the second included 212 college students and 42 adults. Exploratory factor analysis was performed on the data from the first sample, and four factors were extracted and rotated: Social Security, Civilian Constraint, Equality, and Privacy. This exploratory factor analysis was validated on the second sample, and the factor structures were compared across the two samples. Four subscales were created from the four factors; these subscales were then correlated with measures of nationalism, patriotism, internationalism, belief in world government, and support for civil liberties. Validity of the four human rights subscales was ascertained, and differences in human rights attitudes across demographic groups, such as gender and political affiliation, were tested. Results are discussed in light of existing conceptualizations regarding human rights and suggestions for future research are made.

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**THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS** as rights of the individual is a relatively new concept within the history of humankind, having been first articulated during the demise of feudalism, when the breaking of the bond between the individual and the land allowed for the possibility of individual freedom (Vasak, 1982). Today, the concept of individual human rights is a familiar one that has been codified into numerous documents such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and the European Convention for Human Rights. Perhaps the best known human rights document is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Drawn up in 1946 by the United Nations, the

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UDHR globalized the issue of human rights; with the advent of this document human rights were no longer solely dependent upon the whims of state power but were open to the scrutiny and analysis of international political and moral discourse (Beer, 1986).

Since the development and ratification of the UDHR, concerns about its implementation and about human rights abuses have become central to both domestic and international policy agendas—with good reason. Generally speaking, when one thinks of human rights abuses, one thinks of events such as the continuing genocide of the indigenous people of Guatemala or the atrocities perpetrated against the people of El Salvador, the torture of political prisoners or the taking of hostages, the use of child labor or the practice of female infanticide. As defined by the UDHR, however, human rights abuses encompass situations such as job discrimination based on race or ideology, the culturally impoverished environments of most inner cities, and lack of access to the apparatus of government or to the services essential for satisfactory human development—food, education, employment, and medical care. To broaden the definition of human rights in this way is to see that the negation and abuse of human rights are a daily part of the lives of many citizens in many nations.

### **Psychology and Human Rights**

In spite of psychology's long tradition of studying the way in which individuals respond to and interact with one another, there is a surprising dearth of psychological research focusing specifically on human rights attitudes. Studies of intergroup and interpersonal interactions have focused on attitudes toward one's own referent group (ethnocentrism), other groups (racism, prejudice, intolerance), global community (worldmindedness), and politics in general (political ideology). Although these attitudinal dimensions may be related conceptually or causally to human rights attitudes, the human rights domain encompasses much more than what can be measured and described by existing attitude scales. The UDHR draws together a multifaceted array of content and ideological areas (e.g., marriage, employment, political activity, property ownership, race relations, religious practices, individual vs. state responsibility). It links these areas through the underlying theme of human rights, thereby creating a theoretical sphere that, although perhaps related to the attitude domains mentioned above, is conceptually distinct from previously measured attitudes and beliefs. The unique integrative nature of the human rights domain provides a strong case for the development of a separate measure of human rights attitudes.

Psychological interest in and acknowledgment of the importance of human rights issues have been demonstrated by the American Psychological Association's (APA) acceptance of the UDHR and by the APA's advocacy of adherence to the tenets of the UDHR within psychological research and practice (Rosenzweig, 1988). In a twist somewhat uncommon for the field, advocacy has pre-

ceded, rather than followed, theory development. In empirical work reported to date, the vast differences in the methodologies, the samples studied, and the questions asked have led to great difficulty in developing a foundation for a psychological theory of human rights. Atolagbe and Otubanjo (1984) surveyed Nigerian college students on their beliefs regarding the presence or absence of human rights in Nigeria. Harff (1987), studying North American and Australian college students, used an experimental framework to study the way in which emotional arousal translates into empathy for victims and support for prohuman rights political activity. Kauth (1989) asked several questions of primary, secondary, and university students in Argentina to assess their understanding of human rights in Argentina. Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) studied how Canadian students shifted their attitudes regarding human rights across political contexts (e.g., Third World, Soviet Union, and Canada). Rogers and Kitzinger (1986) developed a human rights *Q*-sort to examine the thought structure of 57 individuals regarding the content and role of human rights.

These studies hint at the types of questions a psychological theory of human rights should confront: What are the causal relationships between human rights attitudes, emotions, and behavior? What are the cross-cultural dimensions of human rights attitudes? How do characteristics of respondent and environment influence the way individuals think about human rights? We sought to answer the question, "How do people construe human rights, and how are attitudes regarding human rights interlinked?" The human rights measure we developed served as a vehicle for collecting data with which to discover the underlying structure of human rights attitudes. The development of a human rights questionnaire is an important endeavor in and of itself, because previously used measures (e.g., Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990) have evidenced low reliability.

## Method

Two independent samples of North American college students and a sample of adults completed a measure of human rights attitudes. The first college sample consisted of 365 students from an introductory psychology class. The majority ( $n = 327$ ) were under the age of 21, and approximately 60% ( $n = 214$ ) were female. Data from the first group, the development sample, were used in devising the Human Rights Questionnaire (HRQ).

The second college sample consisted of 212 students and 42 adults. Demographics were not available for this sample, but because the second student sample came from the same pool of respondents as the first student sample, it may be safe to assume that the samples were demographically similar. The adult subgroup in the second sample included 14 men and 28 women, ranging in age from 25 to 82. The data from the two samples were combined and used to validate the analyses performed on the data from the first sample; we therefore labeled the

second sample the validation sample. All respondents lived in a suburban area in southern California.

Group characteristics such as class or ethnicity can result in attitude structures that cancel each other out, thereby leading to the appearance of no underlying attitude structure at all (Herzon, 1980). Therefore, obtaining data from a fairly homogeneous group of respondents such as the respondent groups described above increases the probability of discovering an underlying attitude structure. Although it limits the generalizability of the work, use of a heterogeneous sample provides a methodologically sound way of providing a baseline understanding of human rights attitudes.

### *Materials and Procedures*

*Human Rights Questionnaire.* The HRQ developed and used in this research is based on the text of the UDHR, the most commonly used and referenced index of human rights. The UDHR contains a total of 31 articles addressing the gamut of civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights. Some of the articles consist of one or two sentences, and others are quite lengthy, consisting of several parts.

To ensure that the ideas outlined in each UDHR article were adequately measured within this study, we composed at least three items for each human right presented in the UDHR, leading to a total of 116 items; these items were combined to form the initial version of the HRQ. The items were written in a 7-point, Likert-type, response format, with response options ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The HRQ was completed by both the development and validation samples.

*Political attitudes subscales.* The development sample completed five of the six subscales of the Nationalism–Patriotism Scale developed by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989): Nationalism, Patriotism, Internationalism, Civil Liberties, and World Government. The Nationalism subscale indexes feelings of national superiority and dominance and includes items such as “In view of America’s moral and material superiority, it is only right that we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy.” The Patriotism subscale measures feelings toward the United States; a sample item is “I feel a great pride in that land that is our America.” The Internationalism subscale measures empathy toward all peoples of the world and willingness to share resources with all people; it includes items such as “If necessary, we ought to be willing to lower our standard of living to cooperate with other countries in getting an equal standard for every person in the world.” The Civil Liberties subscale indexes attitudes toward freedom of speech and political beliefs and contains items such as “A person who believes in socialism can still be a good American.” The World Government subscale measures support for the internationalization of military and political power and

includes items such as "All national governments ought to be abolished and replaced by one central world government."

These five subscales will hereafter be referred to as the political attitudes subscales to differentiate them from the human rights subscales presented below.

*Demographics.* The following information was collected for the development sample: political party affiliation, the individual the respondent voted for in the last presidential election (the questionnaire was completed approximately 4 weeks after the 1988 presidential election), estimated family income for the current year and the previous year, and education of both mother and father.

*Procedure.* For the development sample, the HRQ and five political subscales were put together in a packet entitled "Attitudes Toward Current Affairs"; the questionnaires were completed by study participants in group settings. The validation sample also completed the HRQ in group settings. The adult sample completed the HRQ at previously scheduled group meetings. Upon completing the questionnaires, participants were told of the nature and purpose of the study.

## Results

### *Factor Analysis*

*Development sample.* We performed an iterated principal factor analysis on the original pool of 116 items of the HRQ, using data from the development sample ( $N = 365$ ). The scree plot of eigenvalues suggested that between four and six factors should be extracted. Rotation of six factors revealed that the fifth and sixth factors were conceptually indistinguishable from the first four; therefore, we retained only four factors.

Preliminary eigenvalues of the four factors retained were 19.62, 5.01, 3.36, and 2.39, accounting for 51% of the common variance in the 116-item set. These factors were rotated by using the Harris-Kaiser orthoblique procedure with exponent  $e$  set to 0. Inspection of the initial solution revealed that many items loaded less than .30 across all factors. Most factors had very low variance because of high rates of endorsement, so they could not correlate highly with other items. After these low-loading items were deleted, 38 items were reanalyzed using an iterated principle factor analysis. The four factors that emerged accurately replicated the four factors initially extracted and explained 86% of the estimated common variance of the 38-item set. The final four factors and factor loadings are presented in Table 1.

Factor 1 was defined by eight items, six of which had loadings greater than .55. All items on Factor 1 concerned access or entitlement to an adequate standard of living (e.g., food, housing, medical care). This factor was labeled Social Security.

TABLE 1  
Rotated Factor Structure for Development and Validation Samples

Item	Factor loadings (Harris-Kaiser rotation, exponent $e = 0.0$ )							
	Development sample				Validation sample			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1. Mothers and children are entitled to special care and assistance.	<u>.58</u>	.05	-.19	.08	<u>.44</u>	.06	-.10	.24
2. If a person does not make enough money to support his or her family adequately, the family should be aided by the government.	<u>.55</u>	-.06	-.14	.04	<u>.68</u>	.12	-.45	.23
3. All children, even those born out of wedlock, shall enjoy the right to security (e.g., food, clothing, shelter).	<u>.35</u>	-.06	.20	.16	<u>.57</u>	.06	.29	-.06
4. People are entitled to have the food, housing, and medical care necessary to maintain their health and well being.	<u>.66</u>	.00	.02	.02	<u>.66</u>	.16	.08	.01
5. Everyone should have the right to favorable conditions of work.	<u>.49</u>	.08	<u>.42</u>	-.13	<u>.73</u>	.00	.07	-.13
6. All persons should have protection against unemployment.	<u>.57</u>	-.05	-.16	.02	<u>.74</u>	-.09	-.30	.11
7. Everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living.	<u>.71</u>	-.02	.06	-.05	<u>.67</u>	.07	.15	-.02
8. People have the right to security if they lose their means for making a living due to circumstances beyond their control.	<u>.56</u>	.04	.20	-.06	<u>.53</u>	.04	<u>.32</u>	-.28
9. Detention of individuals for political reasons is wrong.	.12	-.34	-.01	.21	-.14	-.42	.25	-.08
10. Any country should have the right to exile persons who hold political views that endanger the government's goals.	-.02	<u>.55</u>	-.08	-.06	-.15	<u>.44</u>	-.05	.03
11. There are times when people should be kept from expressing their opinion.	-.01	<u>.63</u>	.03	.06	-.04	<u>.56</u>	-.16	.09
12. Arrest for political reasons is always wrong.	.07	-.34	-.24	.30	-.13	-.45	.03	.02
13. There are times when detention of political prisoners may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of social order.	-.07	<u>.56</u>	.23	.22	.01	<u>.69</u>	-.03	.12

14. There are times when censorship of the press is justified.	-.02	.47	.14	.05	.03	.56	.11	-.09
15. Some people are not responsible enough to take part in the government of their country.	.02	.44	.11	-.11	.08	.54	.12	-.06
16. Once a person has left his or her country for political reasons, a decision has been made that cannot be changed and the person cannot return to his or her original country.	-.12	.38	-.08	-.15	-.32	.45	.21	-.02
17. Some people are not responsible enough to own property.	.03	.43	-.04	-.11	-.06	.56	.10	-.03
18. Some people do not appreciate the cultural events of their society and should not be encouraged to participate in them.	.02	.37	-.08	-.18	-.07	.31	-.12	-.07
19. Every country should have the right to strip a person of his or her nationality if the person threatens the security of the government of that country.	-.07	.43	.07	.05	.12	.47	.17	.23
20. There are times when people shouldn't be allowed to express their opinions freely because they may endanger established ways of thought.	.17	.60	-.27	-.11	-.07	.57	-.25	-.17
21. All people who wish to work should have the opportunity to do so.	-.04	.09	.50	.11	.53	-.05	.00	-.10
22. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion.	-.12	-.03	.39	.08	-.12	-.01	.58	.11
23. Men and women of full age have a right to marry and establish a family, without regard to their race, nationality, or religion.	-.13	-.08	.43	.12	.08	-.13	.48	-.03
24. Everyone should have the right to leave any country, even his or her own.	-.13	-.14	.55	.07	.07	-.15	.21	.24
25. Women and men should have an equal right to get married.	-.11	-.01	.65	.04	-.04	.01	.55	.04
26. Women and men should have equal rights in divorce or the ending of marriage.	-.05	-.01	.58	-.06	-.06	-.05	.41	.22
27. A person's race or sex should not block the person's access to basic rights and freedoms.	.20	.04	.54	.02	.16	.02	.67	.03
28. Everyone, without discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.	.09	-.04	.53	-.04	.12	.04	.57	-.08
29. All persons have the right to just and reasonable pay for work performed.	.20	.00	.65	-.22	.55	.02	.26	-.18

(table continues)

TABLE 1 (continued)

Item	Factor loadings (Harris-Kaiser rotation, exponent $e = 0.0$ )							
	Development sample				Validation sample			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
30. Men and women should have equal right in a marriage.	.05	.11	.68	.15	-.06	-.03	.60	.00
31. If there is a disagreement between a husband and wife, the wife's views should be considered the final word.	.05	.22	-.48	-.15	-.10	.03	-.55	.10
32. A person should be free to change his or her religion or beliefs.	-.08	.02	.46	.16	-.12	.01	.50	.05
33. Everyone has the right to privacy.	-.04	-.01	-.02	.67	.03	.19	.26	.46
34. One goal of education should be the strengthening of respect for human rights.	.24	.05	.03	.57	.17	.03	.17	.41
35. Everyone should be free to speak his or her opinions.	-.22	-.10	.23	.51	-.02	-.12	.36	.35
36. A person's home is his or her "castle" and should not be interfered with by others.	.00	.11	-.05	.64	-.04	.03	-.12	.75
37. It is never right for the government to read or censor a person's mail.	.01	-.07	-.09	.61	-.04	-.07	.03	.55
38. A person's right to all forms of privacy should be protected by law.	.07	.07	.08	.57	.05	.07	.08	.54

Note. Factor loadings greater than .30 are underlined.

Factor 2 was defined by 12 items with loadings ranging from  $-.34$  to  $.60$ , with most loadings falling in the  $.40$  to  $.50$  range. These items dealt with the acceptability of limiting individual civil and political rights; another way of describing the second factor would be to say that it reflected an anti-human-rights orientation. The factor was labeled Civilian Constraint.

Factor 3 was defined by 12 items. Its loadings ranged from  $-.34$  to  $.68$ , with the majority of the loadings falling in the  $.50$  and  $.60$  range. The theme tying these items together was that of equality, evidenced most clearly by items dealing with equal access to basic rights for all individuals regardless of race, gender, or beliefs (e.g., women and men have equal rights to get married or divorced; a person's race or sex should not block that person's access to basic rights and freedoms; everyone has the right to equal work for equal pay without discrimination). We labeled this factor Equality.

Factor 4 was defined by six items that loaded in the  $.51$  to  $.67$  range. This factor was not as clearly interpretable as the first three factors. Of the six items, four involved individual privacy rights (e.g., everyone has the right to privacy; a person's home should not be interfered with by others; a person's right to all forms of privacy is protected by law; it is never right for the government to read or censor a person's mail). One item concerned education (education should strengthen respect for human rights), and one dealt with speech (everyone should be free to speak his or her opinion). Because a majority of the items, and those with the highest loadings, involved rights to privacy, we labeled this factor Privacy.

The Social Security, Equality, and Privacy factors were moderately correlated with one another (bivariate correlations ranging from  $.58$  to  $.59$ ). All three factors, particularly Social Security and Equality, had rather low correlations with Factor 2, Civilian Constraint (a correlation of  $.09$  for the Social Security and Civilian Constraint factors,  $.13$  for the Civilian Constraint and Equality factors, and  $.25$  for the Privacy and Civilian Constraint factors).

The overall reliability of the HRQ as measured by coefficient alpha was  $.85$ . Four unique subscales were created, with each scale defined as the mean of the sum of the items that defined each factor; items that loaded negatively on the factors were reverse-coded. The coefficients alpha for the four human rights subscales were  $.81$  for the Social Security subscale,  $.76$  for the Civilian Constraint subscale,  $.83$  for the Equality subscale, and  $.78$  for the Privacy subscale.

*Validation sample.* The preceding factor analysis was cross-validated, using data from the second sample. Validation was assessed by extracting and rotating four factors, using the 38-item set that emerged from the factor analysis of the development sample (see the final four columns of Table 1).

With few exceptions, the pattern of item loadings was invariant across the two factor structures. The primary difference was the switched loadings for Items 21 and 29 from the Equality factor in the development sample to the Social Security factor in the validation sample. This change in item loadings did not alter the

definition of Factor 1, because both Items 21 and 29 could be interpreted as referring to either equality in access to work or, alternatively, to work ensuring an individual's social security.

The other noticeable change in the rotated factor structure across samples involved a few cross-loadings of items on factors. The strongest cross-loadings were for Item 2, which loaded .68 on Factor 1 and -.45 on Factor 3, and for Item 35, which loaded .36 on Factor 3 and .35 on Factor 4.

### *Preliminary Construct Validation*

*Correlations with political attitudes.* As defined by the UDHR and as evidenced in the factor structure that emerged from these data, human rights were directly linked to the role of the nation state, the concept of civil liberty, and the general notion of higher level institutional accountability for individuals' rights. Thus, the attitudinal dimensions that define the domain of human rights attitudes should be related to attitudes toward the nation-state, civil liberty, and internationalism. To ascertain whether these conceptual links exist, we conducted a preliminary investigation of the construct validity of the four human rights subscales by correlating scale scores for the four human rights factors with scores obtained from five political attitudes subscales (i.e., Patriotism, Nationalism, World Government, Internationalism, and Civil Liberties; see Table 2).

Given the large sample size, many of the correlations were statistically significant, the most important of which were those of larger magnitude ( $r_s > .30$ ). The strong positive relationship between the Social Security and Internationalism subscales and between the Civilian Constraint and Nationalism subscales, as well as the strong negative correlation between the Civilian Constraint and Civil Liberties subscales, were of particular interest.

Despite the moderate correlations among the Social Security, Equality, and Privacy subscales, the patterns of correlations of these scales with the political

**TABLE 2**  
**Bivariate Correlations of Human Rights Subscales, by Political Attitudes Subscale**

Human rights subscale	Political attitudes subscale				
	Patriotism	Nationalism	World Government	Internationalism	Civil Liberties
Social Security	.10	-.07	.10	.46**	.15
Civilian Constraint	.22**	.50**	-.16*	-.26**	-.44**
Equality	.17*	-.09	.00	.14*	.22**
Privacy	.06	-.00	.12*	.27*	.24**

\* $p \leq .001$ . \*\* $p \leq .0001$ .

attitudes scales were rather divergent. The Equality subscale correlated moderately with the Patriotism subscale, whereas the Social Security subscale correlated very low. The Privacy subscale did not correlate at all. In contrast, the Privacy subscale correlated moderately with the World Government subscale, but the Social Security and Equality subscales had low or no correlations with the World Government scale.

*Relations with demographic variables.* For the development sample, the main effects of gender, political party affiliation, and the candidate for whom the respondent voted in the 1988 presidential election were tested with a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for each human rights subscale (see Table 3).

Females scored significantly higher than males on all subscales, with the largest mean differences on the Social Security and Equality subscales. The mean differences were generally very small, ranging from .18 for the Privacy subscale to .35 for the Social Security subscale.

Democrats scored significantly higher than Republicans on the Social Security subscale and significantly lower than Republicans on the Civilian Constraint subscale. There were no significant differences of political party affiliation across the Equality and Privacy subscales. The only significant effect of Voter Preference was on the Civilian Constraint subscale, with individuals who voted for the 1988 Republican presidential candidate scoring significantly higher than individuals who voted for the Democratic Party presidential candidate.

**TABLE 3**  
**Means on Human Rights Subscales, by Gender and Political Preference**  
**(Development Sample)**

Demographic index	Human rights subscale			
	Social Security	Civilian Constraint	Equality	Privacy
Gender				
Female	6.09 <sub>a</sub>	4.01 <sub>a</sub>	6.66 <sub>a</sub>	6.40 <sub>a</sub>
Male	5.70 <sub>b</sub>	3.90 <sub>b</sub>	6.42 <sub>b</sub>	6.21 <sub>b</sub>
Political party				
Democrat	5.85 <sub>a</sub>	3.61 <sub>a</sub>	6.42 <sub>a</sub>	6.62 <sub>a</sub>
Republican	5.50 <sub>b</sub>	4.25 <sub>b</sub>	6.28 <sub>a</sub>	6.59 <sub>a</sub>
Other	5.84 <sub>a</sub>	3.73 <sub>a</sub>	6.38 <sub>a</sub>	6.43 <sub>a</sub>
Voter preference				
Bush	5.78 <sub>a</sub>	4.22 <sub>a</sub>	6.57 <sub>a</sub>	6.26 <sub>a</sub>
Dukakis	6.18 <sub>a</sub>	3.61 <sub>b</sub>	6.61 <sub>a</sub>	6.44 <sub>a</sub>

*Note.* Within each demographic category, scale means that are significantly different from one another are assigned different letter subscripts, and scale means that are not significantly different are assigned the same letter subscript.

## Discussion

The HRQ is an adequately reliable questionnaire yielding four factors, which are also of acceptable reliability. With minor modifications, the factors were quite robust across two independent samples.

The content of the four human rights factors is reflective of the human rights classification presented in the International Human Rights Covenants (United Nations, 1978). As outlined in these covenants, human rights are structured around two general domains: (a) civil and political, and (b) social, economic, and cultural. Civil and political rights include rights that protect the liberty, security, and physical and spiritual integrity of the person. Specifically, civil rights include rights such as the right to life; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; and the right to a fair trial, to privacy, and to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Political rights include rights such as the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right to vote and to be elected. Economic, social, and cultural rights guarantee full employment, an adequate standard of living, and the social and economic progress of all individuals.

The Social Security and Equality factors presented above included items primarily from the Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (although it can be argued that the Equality items overarch both human rights covenants). Conversely, the Civilian Constraint and Privacy factors were defined largely by items from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The pattern of interfactor correlations indicates that, within this sample, the Privacy factor is conceptually more closely related to the Social Security and Equality factors than it is to the Civilian Constraint factor. The Social Security, Equality, and Privacy factors may form a higher order factor defining the social, economic, and cultural aspects of human rights as conceptualized by the nonelite respondents in our sample.

Basing the HRQ on the UDHR may have facilitated the emergence of a factor structure closely reflecting the United Nations' human rights classification. However, entirely different dimensions could have emerged. Van Boven (1982) separated human rights into those that are fundamental to all individuals, regardless of the relationship between the individual and the state, and those that are dependent upon the nature of the relationship between individual and state (e.g., the right to own property). Within this study, a state-dependent dimension could have been defined by items dealing with things such as government aid to families in need, the right of countries to exile persons who hold unfavorable political views, censorship of the press, or the right of governments to read or censor a person's mail. A state-independent factor could have been defined by items dealing with the right to favorable conditions of work, an adequate standard of living, or freedom of opinion. Additionally, the classi-

fication discussed by Claude (n.d.) as based on political economic behavior could also have emerged. A market-choice factor could have been defined by items dealing with issues such as whether or not people are responsible enough to own property, whether a designer or inventor has the right to ensure the integrity of his or her work, or whether an individual has the right to own property regardless of his or her political viewpoint. Finally, a bargaining choice factor could have emerged, defined by items dealing with issues such as whether or not people should be kept from expressing their opinions, the right of persons to change their religion or beliefs, or the right of the government to read or censor a person's mail. Indeed, with little effort, one could generate myriad alternative attitude structures that could have been represented by the data. (For other possible human rights classifications, see Green, 1975; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985; Marcus, Tabb, & Sullivan, 1974; Sieghart, 1983; and Rogers & Kitzinger, 1986.)

The factor structure that did emerge is conceptually similar to the political thought dimensions discussed by Herzon (1980). Based on a factor analysis of 40 items relating to state and individual behavior, Herzon's analysis uncovered the following dimensions: tough constraint versus removal of constraints (i.e., governmental use of power to monitor individual behavior), welfare activity (guaranteed home mortgages and jobs, health care benefits), governmental monitoring of dissident behavior (censorship of the press, surveillance of political activity), weapons control (disarmament, stationing of troops overseas), government regulation of business (antitrust laws, monitoring of environmental activity in the business sector), military activity (weapons sales, removing overseas troops), defense spending (decreasing federal defense budget), and private control (private clubs restricting membership based on race). If one were to remove from Herzon's list the dimensions that deal with military and defense issues (e.g., weapons control, military activity, and defense spending), the remaining five dimensions he describes (i.e., tough vs. weak constraint, government welfare activity, government monitoring of dissident behavior, government regulation of business, and private control) could be mapped onto the four factors we delineated—in particular, the Civilian Constraint, Social Welfare, and Privacy factors. The conceptual convergence of Herzon's research with our research suggests that the human rights factors presented in this article are not necessarily artifacts resulting from the use of the UDHR, but may accurately represent the underlying attitude dimensions of the participants of this study.

Several articles from the UDHR are not reflected in any of the four human rights dimensions—for example, the right to participate in cultural and leisure activities, the right to peaceful assembly, and the right to join trade unions. Of course, the pattern and magnitude of item loadings may have been influenced by respondent characteristics; with an entirely different sample with different economic, social, or political characteristics, different or additional human

rights dimensions might have emerged. Assessing the generalizability (or lack of generalizability) of the factor structure presented across diverse cultural and economic groups would be a promising avenue for future research.

The preliminary construct validity of the Social Security and Civilian Constraint subscales is evidenced by their relationship to the political attitudes subscales. The Social Security subscale measures beliefs regarding access to basic requirements such as food, housing, and employment, as well as beliefs regarding extraindividual (i.e., governmental) activity geared at guaranteeing such access. Similar to the Social Security subscale, the Internationalism subscale measures comparable attitudes at an international level; the high correlation between these two subscales reflects this underlying similarity in attitudes measured.

The Civilian Constraint subscale measures beliefs concerning curtailment of individual civil rights (justified because certain rights are in conflict with the security needs of the nation state or because an individual is not believed to be inherently worthy of access to civil rights). The strong positive correlation between the Civilian Constraint and Nationalism subscales and the strong negative correlation between the Civilian Constraint and Civil Liberties subscales provide support for this dual interpretation of the Civilian Constraint dimension.

The relatively low correlations between the Equality and Privacy subscales and the five political attitude subscales, although yielding evidence of discriminant validity, provide no strong basis for assessing the construct validity of each of these subscales.

The pattern of correlations between the Civilian Constraint, Nationalism, and Patriotism subscales suggests that attitudes toward Civilian Constraint may be mediated by attitudes regarding the relationship of the state to individual human rights. The possibility of this relationship is further suggested by the effects of political orientation on endorsement levels for the Social Security and Civilian Constraint subscales. Of the four human rights subscales, these two most explicitly implicate the state in human rights issues—the Social Security scale in terms of state assurance of human rights and the Civilian Constraint scale in terms of the importance of state rights versus those of the individual. Differences in endorsement levels across the human rights subscales as a function of political party affiliation underscore this point.

Some of the most fundamental philosophical differences distinguishing Democrats from Republicans concern the relationship between individual and state. Historically, Democrats have been more willing to use governmental resources to assist individuals in need, whereas Republicans place the responsibility for human welfare squarely at the feet of the individual citizen. For Republicans, the role of government is defined more by the needs of the nation as a whole (e.g., defense) than by the needs of individuals within the nation, who are viewed as capable of assisting themselves. Given these divergent philosophical traditions, the differences in endorsement level for the Social Security and Civil-

ian Constraint subscales across political party affiliation may have more to do with participants' attitudes about the role of government regarding human rights than with their attitudes about human rights. A detailed assessment of the influence of political ideology on human rights attitudes would be a very promising project for future research.

Finally, some attention must be paid to the high endorsement rate on the Equality subscale. In light of the recurrent problems of inequality faced by groups within the United States as well as throughout the world, it is doubtful that the respondents in this sample actually support gender, racial, and religious equality to the extent that the data suggest. It is more likely the case that, similar to attitudes toward civil liberties as measured by the Civilian Constraint subscale, attitudes toward equality are mediated by attitudes toward other values. For example, an individual may highly endorse a statement regarding equal access to work based on gender, race, or religion; but he or she might not endorse a statement that both documented and undocumented workers should have equal access to work, believing, instead, that the rights of citizenship outweigh the rights of equality. If researchers could develop test items that place equality rights clearly in conflict with relevant political, social, and economic concerns, they might be better able to differentiate those individuals for whom equality is an absolute right from those for whom it is a conditional one.

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